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FACTS

The plaintiff was a corporation organized under the laws of Hong Kong
with its principal place of business in Wanchai, Hong Kong.' The defendant
was a corporation organized under the laws of New York with its principal
place of business in New York.2 The plaintiff brought a civil suit against
the defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York.3 A default judgment was entered against the defendant.4 The district

Editor's Note: This comment was selected as the best comment for Spring 1997.
This comment is dedicated to my parents and my family. I would like to thank
Professor Pedro A. Malavet and William A. Pinto, Jr. for their help and David M. Gonzalez
and Gregory C. Harrell for their moral support and encouragement.
1. Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
2. Search of LEXIS, Corp Library, Allsos file. (visited May 3, 1997) (searching for
defendant Khalily's principal place of business).
3. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 151.
*
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court judge requested both parties to submit arguments concerning whether
the court had subject matter jurisdiction because Hong Kong was not
recognized by the United States government as a foreign state.' The court
found plaintiff's policy arguments that the court should recognize Hong Kong
as a de facto foreign state for diversity purposes6 unpersuasive. 7 Therefore,
the court vacated the default judgment against the defendant, dismissed the
case without prejudice for refiling in state court, and HELD
that Hong Kong
8
was not a recognized foreign state for diversity purposes.
II.

HISTORY

The power of a federal court to adjudicate controversies between citizens
of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state is expressly conferred by
the U.S. Constitution.9 Federal courts are given the power to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign citizen in international matters where the national
interest is paramount.'0 However, for a federal court to have subject matter
jurisdiction over this type of civil suit, the court must first have alienage
diversity." Specifically, the court must establish that the foreign entity in2
the suit has been recognized as a foreign state by the United States.'

4. Id. at 152. The court gave no reason for the entry of default judgment. Id.
5. Id.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994) (providing that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of a State and citizens
or subjects of a foreign state").
7. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152 (stating that "[t]hese policy arguments are unavailing
because it is not the role of the judiciary to recognize foreign states, but rather that is a
function of the executive branch").
8. Id. at 152-53.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10. See Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980). The court stated:
The dominant considerations which prompted the provision
for such jurisdiction appear to have been:
(1) Failure on the part of the individual states to give protection to foreigners
under treaties; [and]
(2) Apprehension of entanglements with other sovereigns that might ensure
from failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level.
Id. (quoting Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955))
(citations omitted); see Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir.
1990).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (presuming that a court must first have alienage
jurisdiction). The court stated: "[A]n alien domiciled in one of the United States is afforded
access to the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) even when he sues an American
citizen residing in the same state." Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1183 (citing C. H. Nichols Lumber Co.
v. Franson, 203 U.S. 278 (1906)).
12. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152 (citing Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635,
637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 670 (1940)).
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Procedurally, there are two ways in which a foreign entity can be recognized
as a foreign state. One is through a formal recognition by the President of
the United States," and the other is through a de facto recognition by the
courts. 14

A.

Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics Ltd.:
Hong Kong Is Not a Foreign State

Windert Watch Co. v. Remex Electronics Ltd. 5 was the first case in the
Southern District of New York that declared Hong Kong was not a foreign
state.16 In Windert, the plaintiff, a California corporation which distributed
wristwatches, sued two Hong Kong corporations and a British corporation for
lost profits and punitive damages. 7 The Hong Kong corporations moved
to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 The Hong
Kong corporations argued that the court lacked diversity jurisdiction because
Hong Kong was not a foreign state within the meaning of the diversity
statute. 9 The court agreed.2"
The court noted that the United States had not given Hong Kong either
formal or de facto recognition as a foreign state because Hong Kong was a
Crown Colony of the United Kingdom.2' Unlike the exchange of ambassa-

13. See, e.g., Land Oberoesterreich, 109 F.2d at 637 (holding that a foreign state must
first be recognized by the U.S. government, after which "its subjects and its citizens, including
its corporations, may be suitors in our [federal] courts"); see also Iran Handicraft & Carpet
Export Ctr. v. Marijan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing National
City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955)) (restating that the power to
recognize a foreign state is conferred to the executive branch by Article II of the U.S.
Constitution and that "it is outside the competence of the judiciary to pass judgement upon
executive branch decisions regarding recognition").
14. See, e.g., Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954). In Murarka,
the court stated that although the United States had not formally recognized India as an
independent nation at the time of the suit, the steps the United States had taken to recognize
the Interim Government of India by exchanging ambassadors between the countries amounted
at least to de facto recognition, if not more. Id. It stated: "Unless form rather than substance
is to govern, we think that in every substantial sense by the time this complaint was filed
India had become an independent international entity and was so recognized by the United
States." Id.; see also Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.3
(N.D.Ill. 1980) (finding that "it seems clear that something less than formal recognition of a
state by the United States government will suffice to satisfy the foreign diversity jurisdiction
requirement. . .. [D]e facto recognition may be based on significant trade relations, cultural
and/or other contacts with a nation on a nongovernmental level").
15. 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
16. Id. at 1246.
17. Id. at 1243-44.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1244 ([D]iversity is lacking because they [we]re citizens of Hong Kong....
An alien corporation is a citizen of the entity under the laws of which it is incorporated.").
20. Id. at 1246.
21. Id. at 1245.
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dors with India in 1947,22 the United States had no direct diplomatic23
dealings with Hong Kong because Hong Kong was a British colony.
Furthermore, the court indicated that the State Department also confirmed
that the United States did not 24
recognize Hong Kong as an independent state
colony.
British
a
as
rather
but
The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that Hong Kong was a
political subdivision 25 of the United Kingdom.26 The court observed that
the Parliament Titles Act of 1927 did not include Hong Kong as part of the
United Kingdom, rather the Act states that only England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland make up the United Kingdom. Therefore, Hong Kong
was not a political subdivision of the United Kingdom.27 Moreover, under
section 406 of the 1948 Companies Act, corporations formed under the laws
of Hong Kong do not receive privileges of British nationality.2 8 Since the
Hong Kong corporations were not citizens of a foreign state, the court
dismissed the plaintiff's claim for lack of jurisdiction.29
B.

Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen:
Hong Kong Is a Foreign State

In 1984, five years after the Windert decision, the same district court in
Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen3" stated in dictum that it would
recognize Hong Kong as a foreign state for diversity purposes.3 Unlike the
plaintiff in Windert, which was a U.S. corporation, the plaintiffs in Tetra
were Hong Kong corporations.3 2 Represented by their liquidators, who
were U.K. citizens, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for $35 million in loans
allegedly made to the defendants and for breach of their fiduciary duties to
the plaintiffs.33 Relying on Windert, the defendants moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the theory that Hong Kong was

22. See Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552.
23. Windert, 468 F. Supp. at 1245.
24. Id.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (defining "[a] 'foreign state' ... [as] includ[ing] a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state").
26. Windert, 468 F. Supp. at 1245.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1246 (citing Companies Act 1948 § 406). Natural persons, however, who are
citizens of British colonies are considered to be subjects of the Crown. Id. (citing British
Nationality Act 1948 § 1).
29. Id.
30. 584 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
31. Id. at 848.
32. Id.
33. Id. The liquidators were appointed by the court in Hong Kong. Id.
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not recognized as a foreign state.34
Although the court denied the motion because the liquidators'
citizenships could be used to determine diversity in the case, 3 the court
nevertheless, in dictum, rejected the defendants' argument that Hong Kong
was not a foreign state. 36 The court pointed out that federal courts in the
past have applied laws of Hong Kong in appropriate situations." The court
noted that the United States was Hong Kong's largest foreign investor and
trading partner.38 The relationship between the two political states should
compel the court to recognize Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state.39
Furthermore, the court stated that for diversity purposes, other courts have
recognized other British colonies as foreign states. 40 For these reasons, the
court noted that it would be "hypertechnical" to prevent Hong Kong
corporations from seeking redress in the federal courts simply because Hong
Kong had not been formally recognized as a foreign state by the United
States.4 1

34. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1) and 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2). Id.
35. Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 849; see FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (providing that "[a] party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is bought").
36. Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 848.
37. Id.; see also Windsor Indus., Inc. v. EACA Int'l Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 635, 641
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the applicable law to the action was Hong Kong law). The
Windsor court stated in the beginning of its opinion that its "jurisdiction [wa]s grounded upon
the parties' diverse citizenship." Id. at 636. In other words, diversity was not even an issue
because the court recognized Hong Kong as a foreign state from the outset.
38. Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 848; see American Consulate General Hong Kong,
<http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/HKI/wwwhmain.html> (visited Oct. 16, 1997) and Trade
& Industry, <http://www.info.gov.hk/hkbi/6/stop6-1 .htm> (visited May 9, 1997) (this address
is still current as of Oct. 16, 1997, but the data has been updated). Although the United States
is no longer Hong Kong's largest foreign investor as it was in 1984 when Tetra was decided,
it is still one of the top investors. In 1996, the United States was Hong Kong's second largest
trading partner (after China), with US$54 billion, up 14.2% over 1995. Id.
39. Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 848 (stating that "[t]he commercial and cultural realities of the
modem world dictate that diversity jurisdiction should be granted to certain governmental
entities that have not been formally recognized"); see Chang V. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp.,
506 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.3 (N.D.Ill. 1980).
40. Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 848; see, e.g., Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717
F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that diversity existed without question, and the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were satisfied instead of questioning the foreign state status
of Bermuda); see also Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 (7th Cir.
1990) (affirming lower court's decision that subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
was present because courts have recognized diversity where the corporations are from the
British territories of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands).
41. Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 848 (stating that "[i]t would seem hypertechnical to preclude
Hong Kong corporations from asserting claims in our courts simply because Hong Kong has
not been formally recognized by the United States as a foreign sovereign in its own right").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

5

FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal
of International
Law,
Vol. 10, Iss. 2LAW
[1995], Art. 7

[Vol. 10

The Tetra decision reflected the trend of that period in which many
federal courts had discarded the rigid standard of formal recognition and
adopted the more lax de facto standard.42 In cases of other jurisdictions in
which Hong Kong corporations also were the plaintiffs, the courts rejected
the rigid formal recognition standard and adopted Tetra's reasoning to find
diversity jurisdiction.43 This trend, which lasted for about sixteen years,
would be interrupted by the decision of the instant case."
Ill.

INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the district court found that Hong Kong was not a
foreign state, formal or de facto.45 Since the court did not have diversity
jurisdiction, it dismissed the case and vacated the default judgment against
the defendant.4 6 The instant court's decision essentially dismissed Tetra's
reasoning that Hong Kong should be recognized as a de facto foreign
state.47
By dismissing the case, the instant court adhered to the rule that only the
executive branch may recognize a foreign state.4" The court relied on a
letter from the State Department that stated that the United States does not
recognize Hong Kong as a sovereign state.49 The court then rejected the de
facto recognition arguments because they were unpersuasive policy
arguments, and because the court did not have the power to recognize foreign

42. See, e.g., Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 978 n.3.
43. See, e.g., Timco Eng'g, Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp. 925, 930 n.8 (E.D.Pa. 1985)
(holding that "the presence of a Hong Kong citizen as a plaintiff in a suit between otherwise
diverse United States citizens d[id] not deprive th[e] court of subject matter jurisdiction"); see
also Creative Distrib., Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc., No. 89-C-3614, 1989 WL 105210, at *2
(N.D.I1l. Sept. 1, 1989) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of diversity
jurisdiction because based on the reasons stated in Tetra and Chang, Hong Kong appeared to
have been recognized de facto by the "United States and its court system").
44. See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. at 152-53; see also Chang, 506 F.
Supp. at 978 n.3 (finding "such [de facto] recognition here based on significant trade relations,
cultural and/or other contacts," thereby establishing the commercial and cultural criteria for
recognition of a de facto foreign state, which was used for the next sixteen years).
45. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
46. Id. at 152-53.
47. Id. at 153 & n.2.
48. Id. at 152; see, e.g., Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Maian Int'l Corp., 655
F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (stating that the "[r]ecognition of foreign governments... remain[ed]
essentially a political act, which the executive branch alone is empowered to undertake"). Id.
However, if a foreign state has been recognized by the United States, a subsequent
nonrecognition of its government, such as the Khomeni regime in Iran, would not result in the
nonrecognition of the nation as a foreign state. Id.
49. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152. The letter to the court in a previous case, dated April
4, 1995 was from the State Department Assistant Legal Adviser Jim Hergen and confirmed
that the United States does not recognize Hong Kong as a sovereign state. Id.
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states. 50

The instant court explained that unlike India in 1954, when the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the country as a de facto foreign state,
Hong Kong was not substantially a foreign state.5 The court pointed out
that at the time of the filing of the complaint, Hong Kong would not revert
back to China for another one and a half years.52 Accordingly, "the United
States ha[d] not yet taken substantial steps to recognize Hong Kong as a fully
incorporated part of China."53
With regard to the cases in which the courts recognized other British
territories as foreign states, the instant court dismissed the significance of
those cases because subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised as an
issue, 4 and because courts do not have the power to recognize foreign
states. 5 Accordingly, the instant court found the fact that other district
courts have applied Hong Kong laws and enforced Hong Kong judgments
irrelevant because those courts did not expressly consider whether Hong
Kong should be recognized as a de facto foreign state.56 Holding that the
judiciary branch has no power to recognize foreign states, the instant court
vacated the default judgment against the defendant
and dismissed the entire
57
court.
state
in
refiling
for
prejudice
case without

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE INSTANT CASE
A.

Effect on the Southern District of New York

On its face, the decision of the instant case impacts de facto recognition
by narrowing the number of ways by which a foreign entity can be
recognized as a foreign state. 58 Since Tetra's contribution was only dictum,
the rejection of Tetra's reasoning by the instant court merely reaffirms the

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 152-53.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id.

54. Id. at 152-53; see, e.g., Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735
(2d Cir. 1983).

55. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 153.
56. Id. at 153 n.3 (citing Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 847).
57. Id. at 153.

58. This trend of de facto recognition due to commercial and cultural ties began with the
Chang decision in 1980. See Chang,506 F. Supp. at 975. But cf.Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.,
215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954) (implicitly holding that foreign state recognition could be
inferred from political acts by the executive branch, such as an exchange of ambassadors).
The court in the instant case interprets that de facto recognition can only be inferred from
political acts by the executive branch. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152. Since economic and
cultural factors are not political in the sense that they are not within the realm of the
President's power, they are irrelevant.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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district court's position, which previously had been established by the
Windert decision. 9 Unlike Tetra, which allowed the factors of commercial
and cultural ties to be considered, the instant decision limits the factors to
political recognitions.' By adhering to the rule that only the executive
branch may recognize foreign states, the instant court also declares that
district courts have no power to recognize de facto foreign states, which had
been the practice of the federal district courts throughout the sixteen-year
trend.6'
Like Windert, the instant court relied on the State Department to confirm
that the United States did not recognize Hong Kong as a foreign state.6 2
While this policy is contrary to the trend of unaided de facto recognition
through commercial and cultural ties,63 it nevertheless enables courts to
avoid potential conflicts with the executive branch in the matters of
international policy.'
Clearly, one of the reasons behind the instant
decision was to avoid such conflicts since matters of international affairs rest
with the executive branch of the government. 5 On the other hand, given
the improvements in communication technology and the growth in global
economics, the United States might benefit from a flexible foreign affairs
policy where foreign entities seek redress in the federal courts despite a lack

59. See Windert, 468 F. Supp. at 1246.
60. See Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152 (stating that "[a]lthough there are strong
commercial ties between Hong Kong and the United States, . . . [they] do not constitute
recognition of Hong Kong as a de facto foreign state by our government").
61. Id.; see, e.g., Timco Eng'g, Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp. 925, 930 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Windsor Indus., Inc. v. EACA Int'l Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 635, 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Creative Distrib., Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc., No. 89-C-3614, 1989 WL 105210, at *2 (N.D.
I1l. Sept. 1, 1989). For a discussion, see supra note 37 for a discussion of applying Hong
Kong law.
62. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. See Timco, 603 F. Supp. at 930 n.8; Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 975; Creative Distrib.,
1989 WL 105210, at *2.
64. See Land Oberoesterreich v. Gude, 109 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1940); Iran Handicraft
& Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, . . . and he shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors."); see also U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall receive Ambassadors.
); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such
an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but
which, ... must be exercise in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution.
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of formal recognition as foreign states.' In light of potential conflicts with
the executive branch in matters of foreign policy, the federal courts would
need to reconcile the de facto recognitions with the policies of the current
administration.67
Nevertheless, the impact of the instant decision may be minimal since the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has never spoken on whether Hong Kong
should be recognized as a de facto foreign state. 68 Thus, the Southern
District of New York could reverse the instant decision and readopt Tetra's
reasoning in a similar subsequent case. 69 Furthermore, Hong Kong reverted
70
to China on July 1, 1997, as had been indicated by the instant court.

Since China is a formally recognized foreign state, the reversion allows Hong
Kong corporations to be considered as citizens of a foreign state, and thus the
federal courts will have diversity jurisdiction. 7 1 As a result, the impact, if
any, of this instant decision on the Southern District of New York will last
less than a year.72
B.

Effect on Other Jurisdictions

The impact of the instant decision on other jurisdictions probably will be
minimal because the decision would be only persuasive authority.73 During
the sixteen-year period, the courts that recognized Hong Kong as a de facto
foreign state explicitly rejected the rigid formal recognition established by
Windert, which the instant court has implicitly followed. 74 The adoption of

66. See Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 977 n.2 (observing that "[t]here must be flexibility in
foreign affairs as we approach the 21st century, so that the United States and the citizens may
maintain 'commercial, cultural and other relations' with another nation and its citizens even
in the absence of official diplomatic relations. . . . Allowing only foreign nationals of
countries 'formally recognized' by the United States to sue in our federal courts would impair
that flexibility.") (citation omitted).
67. See id. at 977-78. For example, the Chang court looked to the 1948 Treaty of
Friendship,Commerce and Navigation, the PresidentialMemorandum of December 30, 1978,
and The Taiwanese Relations Act of 1979, for guidance in deciding whether citizens of
Taiwan had standing to sue in the U.S. courts. Id.
68. See JOHN W. HARDWICKE, BuSINESS LAW 5 (1992). The principle of stare decisis
would bind all of the lower courts to the holding of the highest court in the same jurisdiction.

Id.
69. Id. This possibility of reversing decisions within a district is demonstrated by the

changes in the decisions from Windert to Tetra to the instant case because the issue of
whether Hong Kong was recognized as a foreign state never had been decided by a higher
court.

70. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
71. Id.

72. Id. at 151. The opinion was given on August 21, 1996.
73. See HENNEY HEGLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF LAW 40-41

(1995). Since the instant decision is not controlling authority for these jurisdictions under
stare decisis, it is only persuasive authority.

74. See cases cited supra note 61.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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Tetra's reasoning by these jurisdictions shows that they believe that the
twenty-first century warrants a flexible foreign affairs policy.7" A policy
under which foreign entities, who although they have not been formally
recognized as foreign states, still may be able to seek redress in the federal
court system.76 Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the issue of foreign state
recognition probably is not raised because of apparent commercial and
cultural ties." For these reasons, the impact of the instant decision on other
jurisdictions appears to be minimal.
C.

Significance of the Instant Case Beyond the Facts

The issue of whether Hong Kong should be recognized as a foreign state
is no longer relevant since it reverted to China on July 1, 1997.78 Nonetheless, in reading beyond the facts of the instant case, the larger issue is
whether the federal courts have the power to recognize de facto foreign
states.7 9 Although some federal district courts believe that they have the
power to recognize de facto foreign states,8" at least one does not.8 ' The
dichotomy of opinions by the districts courts shows that there is a need for
82
a decisive ruling on this particular issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In today's world of multilateral trade and investment, efficiency in
transactions is critical. Parties should have the opportunity for quick and fair
dispute resolutions. Perhaps international arbitration would be the most
appropriate solution. On the other hand, U.S. courts also should have the
opportunity to control the volume of their cases. When the courts deny
parties the opportunity to seek redress, they are effectively setting up
obstructions against mutually beneficial business dealings.

75. See supra note 66 for a discussion of commercial and cultural factors.
76. See supra note 66 for a discussion of commercial and cultural factors.
77. See, e.g., Windsor, 548 F. Supp. at 641 (implying that recognition of Hong Kong as
a foreign state was not an issue because the court's jurisdiction was grounded upon the
parties' diverse citizenships); see also Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d
731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983) (also stating implicitly that the status of Bermuda as a foreign state
was not an issue since diversity jurisdiction existed).
78. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 152.
79. Id.

80. Both Chang and Creative were decided in the Northern District of Illinois, which is
in the 7th Circuit. Timco was decided in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is in the
3rd Circuit. And Windsor was decided in the Eastern District of New York, which is in the
2nd Circuit.
81. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 153.

82. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over cases and controversies that arise under the
U.S. Constitution and federal laws of the United States between two or more states. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. There are no appellate opinions from the Courts of Appeals that

clearly hold that district courts either could or could not recognize de facto foreign states.
Therefore, without "conflicts" among the circuits, it seems improbable that the Supreme Court
will decide on this particular issue anytime soon.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss2/7
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In addition, it does not appear that the courts that recognized Hong Kong
as a de facto foreign state were usurping the executive branch's powers.
They were merely retaining their flexibility in deciding who deserves the
opportunity to seek redress. Until there is a Supreme Court ruling on this
issue, plaintiffs from nonrecognized foreign nations can only make their
decisions to sue based on the prevailing law within the particular federal
circuit or within the district if there has been no ruling by that -federal
circuit.83
Even if courts do not have the power to recognize de facto foreign states,
it should be noted that a plaintiff corporation whose country is not a
recognized foreign state may still be able to circumvent the diversity
problem. As was shown in Tetra, a plaintiff corporation could obtain a
court-appointed party whose country is a recognized state to represent the
corporation.84 Moreover, as is shown in the instant case, a plaintiff would
not be completely without opportunity to seek redress if the district court
dismisses the case without prejudice for refiling in the state court.85
V.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the instant decision will probably be minimal. The
decision has no binding effect on the Southern District of New York or any
other federal district courts.8 6 Moreover, since Hong Kong reverted to
China on July 1, 1997 and is no longer a British colony, it is now recognized
as a foreign state for diversity purposes.8 7 Thus, even if the decision had
been binding, its effect would have been only temporary. Hong Kong
corporations now have standing to sue or be sued in federal courts throughout the United States. However, the larger issue of whether federal district
courts have the power to recognize de facto foreign states continues to be
uncertain.

83. HARDWICKE, supra note 68, at 5.
84. See Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 849; see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S.
823, 829-30 (1969). The Court in Kramer held that although the assignment of claim by a
Panamanian corporation to a Texas lawyer was valid as a matter of Texas law, the assignment
would not create diversity jurisdiction because the assignment was" 'improperly or collusively
made'" under the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 and accepting this "'manufactur[ing]' [of]
federal jurisdiction" would hinder the purpose of § 1359) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336 (1895); Little V. Giles, 118 U.S. 596, 602 (1886)). But see 28
U.S.C. § 1359 (prohibiting the improper assignment of parties to invoke subject matter
jurisdiction). Therefore, as shown in Tetra, while FED. R. Crv. P. 17(a) allows a corporation
plaintiff from a nonrecognized foreign state to assign its claim to a representing party from
a recognized foreign state in a civil suit, the representing party must have a legal interest in
the plaintiff's case in order for the assignment to be valid so as to invoke diversity.
85. Matimak, 936 F. Supp. at 153.

86. Id.
87. See id. at 152.
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